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Model Sentencing Guidelines §3.7 Acceptance of
Responsibility
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense
level by one level.
[(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under sub-
section (a), and the government notifies the court
that the defendant has assisted the authorities in
the investigation or prosecution of his own miscon-
duct by timely notifying authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty thereby permitting the gov-
ernment to avoid preparing for trial and permitting
the court and the government to allocate their
resources efficiently, the court should consider the
defendant's timely assistance as a mitigating factor
when determining the defendant's sentence within
the applicable range.]
Application Notes
i. [It is anticipated that language closely tracking Application
Notes 1-5 of the current Acceptance of Responsibility guide-
line, U.S.S.G. 53E.i, would serve equally well in this model
guideline.]
Drafter's Commentary
So long as the federal criminal justice system is dependent
on resolution of a high percentage of cases by plea rather
than trial, there will be a need for incentives to plead
guilty. Historically, the most common of such incentives
have been reductions in sentence for those who plead
guilty. The current Federal Sentencing Guidelines offi-
cially sanction at least two such incentives - the
acceptance of responsibility adjustments of U.S.S.G.
S3EI.I and the early disposition ("fast-track") adjustments
of U.S.S.G. sK3.I. I say that the Guidelines "officially
sanction" these two incentives because of the evidence
that a variety of other incentives to plead are also on offer
throughout the federal system. These include promises to
dismiss, or not indict, counts as part of charge bargains,
agreements not to seek certain enhancements, such as the
second-offender information of 21 U.S.C. §5 841, 851,' and
bargaining over facts and sentencing factors.
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This is not the place to debate the necessity, legitimacy,
or desirability of each of the foregoing varieties of plea
incentive. For present purposes it is enough to say that
any system of simplified guidelines designed to replace
the current Federal Sentencing Guidelines should have a
mechanism to account for (or reward, if one prefers a
blunter term) a defendant's choice to "accept responsibil-
ity" for his misdeeds by pleading guilty. Model Sentencing
Guidelines 3.7 essentially replicates the current accept-
ance of responsibility guideline, U.S.S.G. 3EI.I, so far as
is possible within the model structure. Two differences
between the model and current systems are apparent.
First, because of the somewhat wider ranges in the model
system, an acceptance of responsibility reduction will, at
some points on the sentencing table, represent a larger
reduction in sentencing range than is presently the case.
Second, for the same reason, it was thought undesirable to
provide any additional reduction in offense level and thus
in sentencing range for those defendants who plead guilty
early and save the court and government the resources
associated with trial preparation. In short, there is no
offense level reduction analogous to what is now colloqui-
ally known as "super acceptance of responsibility" under
U.S.S.G. S3Ei.i(b). Should it nonetheless be thought desir-
able to provide some acknowledgment of early plea
decisions, Model Guideline S3.7 includes a bracketed Sec-
tion (b) that would make such an early plea decision an
advisory mitigating factor within the applicable guideline
range.
It is difficult to predict with any precision how this new
acceptance of responsibility provision, or indeed the entire
structure proposed here, would affect the plea bargaining
dynamic in federal cases. After all, back in 1987 most
informed observers predicted that the advent of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines would dramatically reduce
pleas and markedly increase the number of cases taken to
trial. But as we know, the Guidelines have had the exactly
opposite effect - the percentage of cases resolved by plea
has been climbing steadily for years and even in the period
of legal uncertainty that began in 2004 with Blakely v.
Washington has remained around 95%. 2 Nonetheless, one
can hazard a few provisional observations.
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First, the Model Guidelines system would have meas-
urably fewer decision points with mandatory effects over
which bargains could be struck. For example, the current
fraud guideline is built around a loss table of sixteen lev-
elsA while the loss table in the model fraud guideline has
only six levels.4 Likewise, the current fraud guideline lists
more than thirty possible non-loss sentencing factors,
each one of which, if found by the judge, imposes a
mandatory offense level increase. By contrast the model
fraud guideline lists 10-12 factors with mandatory effects
on offense level; the remainder of the factors mentioned
in the model guideline have merely advisory effect within
the applicable sentencing range. In consequence, under
the model system, there are fewer decision points over
which to haggle during plea negotiations. This might pro-
duce slightly less bargaining leverage for the government.
Second, on the other hand, some facts that under the
existing Guidelines are matters for judicial decision
would become like elements of the crime insofar as they
would have to be pled and proven at trial or explicitly
admitted as part of a guilty plea. This new class of what
might be called "guidelines elements" would presumably
become the legitimate subject of charge bargaining, and
thus a matter within the ambit of prosecutorial discretion
and not subject to second-guessing by probation officers
or the court. This feature of the model system might
slightly increase prosecutorial bargaining leverage. How-
ever, any increase in prosecutorial control resulting from
a larger set of facts subject to charge bargaining might
well be offset by the requirement that, absent agree-
ments, such facts would have to be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
It would be unwise to make precise predictions about
how these and other factors would play out in the transi-
tion to a simplified federal sentencing system. However,
there seems little doubt that the model system contains
ample room for appropriate plea bargaining and more
than adequate incentives for the entry of guilty pleas by
defendants seeking to avail themselves of that avenue to
resolve their cases.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §3.8 Substantial
Assistance to Authorities
[Upon motion of the government stating that] [If] the
defendant provided substantial assistance in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of another person who has committed
an offense, the court may impose a sentence [one offense
level] [up to two offense levels] below the otherwise appli-
cable guideline range.
The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the
court for reasons stated that may include, but are not lim-
ited to, consideration of the following:
(a) the court's evaluation of the significance and useful-
ness of the defendant's assistance, taking into
consideration the government's evaluation of the assis-
tance rendered;
(b) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of
any information or testimony provided by the defen-
dant;
(c) the nature and extent of the defendant's assis-
tance;
(d) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of
injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his
assistance;
(e) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
Application Notes:
i. The sentencing reduction for assistance to authorities shall
be considered independently of any reduction for acceptance
of responsibility pursuant to Model Sentencing Guidelines
h7.7. Substantial assistance is directed to the investigation
and prosecution of criminal activities by persons other than
the defendant, while acceptance of responsibility is directed
to the defendant's affirmative recognition of responsibility
for his own conduct.
Drafter's Commentary
There is near-universal agreement that sentence reduc-
tions for cooperation with authorities in the investigation
or prosecution of other persons are, at the least, a neces-
sary tool of modern federal criminal investigation. There
is thus no dissent from the proposition that a simplified
guidelines system should contain a provision for down-
ward departures from the range created by trial or plea
based on substantial assistance to the government. How-
ever, there exist lively differences of opinion about the
details of such a provision. Several probable fault lines in a
debate over a new substantial assistance guideline are sug-
gested by the bracketed language in Model Sentencing
Guidelines 3.8.
The government motion requirement: Perhaps the
single most hotly contested point about the current sub-
stantial assistance guideline, U.S.S.G. s5Ki.I, is the
language requiring a government motion as a precondi-
tion for the court's award of a substantial assistance
departure.5 It is fair to say that virtually all defense
lawyers (including all those in the working group on
this project) and a great many judges and academics
would prefer to eliminate the government motion
requirement, leaving the determination of whether a
defendant has provided substantial assistance within
the province of the judge. 6 The Sentencing Commission
has thought otherwise, and its position is enthusiasti-
cally supported by the Department of Justice. On this
point, for reasons I have explained at length elsewhere,
I side with the Commission and the Department.7 How-
ever, this is not an issue that needs to be resolved for
the present. As indicated by the bracketed language in
Model Sentencing Guidelines 53.8, a model substantial
assistance guideline can be drafted to match either of
the competing preferences with the addition or subtrac-
tion of seven words.
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Extent of departure: In the existing Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, once a judge has granted the
government's motion for a substantial assistance depar-
ture, in any case not involving a statutory minimum
mandatory sentence the court is effectively free to
depart as little or as much as seems appropriate to him.
8
There is at least a question as to whether in a new sys-
tem the same unfettered discretion should be preserved,
or whether the maximum extent of a substantial assis-
tance departure should be prescribed by rule. Some
might argue that the value of substantial assistance is so
difficult to assess that no advance quantification is pos-
sible. Others might respond that the mitigating value of
substantial assistance is no more intrinsically difficult
to quantify than the aggravating value of, say, role in the
offense or participation in a fraud scheme employing
"sophisticated means," yet the current guidelines quan-
tify the effect of those enhancements.9 Moreover, one
need not possess a precise scale for valuing substantial
assistance from case to case to conclude that some max-
imum value should be assigned to substantial
assistance as a general category.
Once again, the model guideline does not resolve these
debates. Rather, it includes as an option for discussion
bracketed language that would impose a limit of either
one or two offense levels on the extent of the available
departure. The bracketed material, and the limitation,
could be omitted entirely.
Effect of mandatory minimum sentences: Under exist-
ing law, in a case involving a statutory mandatory
minimum sentence, the court may depart below both the
guideline range and the mandatory minimum sentence
only if the government moves for a guidelines departure
under Section 5 KI.I and a statutory departure under 18
U.S.C. 3553(e). I0 This model guideline does not attempt
to address the issues raised by the interaction of the guide-
lines and mandatory minimum sentences in such cases.
However, these issues should be discussed and an appro-
priate resolution integrated into any real-world
embodiment of this model.
Notes
1 These statues provide that a defendant who commits a sec-
ond drug offense is subject to having the maximum and
minimum term of his sentence doubled if the government
files and proves the allegations in a "second-offender infor-
mation," 21 U.S.C. § 851.
2 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING STATISTICS, Sec. 3, Fig. C (2006).
3 U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1) (2005).
4 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Economic Crimes, 18 FED. SENT.
REP. 330 (2006).
5 The rule is slightly more complicated than this categorical
statement would imply in that courts have held that the gov-
ernment may not withhold a motion for improper reasons.
See, ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK 0. BOWMAN, Ill, AND JENNIFER C.
WOLL, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1473-96
(2006) (discussing the nuances of the government motion
requirement). However, as a practical matter, substantial
assistance departures are virtually never awarded in the
absence of a government motion.
6 See, e.g., The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and
Proposal on Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503 (2001). For a sampling
of the extensive academic literature to the same effect, see
HAINES, BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 5, at 1474 n. 68.
7 Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year
of Judicial Revolt on Substantial Assistance Departures Follows
a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7
(1999). See also, Ronald S. Safer and Matthew C. Crowl, Sub-
stantial Assistance Departures: Valuable Took or Dangerous
Weapon, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 41 (1999).
8 See generally, HAINES, BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 5, at 1500-
03. There are some limitations on the judge's departure
power. Several courts have held that a defendant may not
appeal the extent of a substantial assistance departure, but
that the government may. See, e.g., United States v. Pepper,
412 F3d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 2005). Many courts have held that
the extent of the departure must be justified based on the
defendant's substantial assistance and not on other factors
such as family circumstances, aberrant behavior, or extraordi-
nary rehabilitation. HAINES, BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 3, at
1501. Nonetheless, the judge's discretion is broad indeed.
9 See U.S.S.G. §§3B1.1 and 3B1.2 (adjustments for aggravat-
ing and mitigating role), and §211.1(b)(9)(C) (2005)
(sophisticated means enhancement to fraud and theft guide-
line).
10 For discussion of the complications involved in substantial
assistance cases with mandatory minimum sentences, see
id., at 1472-73.
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